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Article 8

Religion and the Restatements
Ian Bartrum†
INTRODUCTION
As Western democracies go, we are an unusually religious
people. A recent Gallup International study on comparative
religiosity found that 60% of Americans described themselves as
“religious,” while the percentages were generally much lower in
Canada, Australia, and Western Europe.1 Conversely, only five
percent of Americans identified themselves as “atheists,” which
places the United States among the world’s least atheistic
nations, and on a par with Saudi Arabia.2 The underlying causes
of our national religiosity are undoubtedly complex—and they are
decidedly not the subjects of this paper—but it seems likely that
our distinctive legal traditions surrounding religious freedom have
played a significant role in shaping our cultural norms.3 France
and Turkey, perhaps our most notable peers in the formal
separation of church and state, rank well below the United States
in religiosity at 37% and 23% respectively.4 This may be a result of
French and Turkish legal traditions that are openly suspicious—
perhaps even hostile—toward organized religion, and which have
in large part sought to insulate the state from undue clerical
influence.5 In stark contrast, an important strain of the American
† Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. Many
thanks to Anita Bernstein for organizing this symposium and asking me to take part.
Thanks also to Marc DeGirolami, Rick Garnett, Leslie Griffin, Marci Hamilton,
Michael Helfand, Paul Horwitz, Chris Lund, my fellow symposium participants, and
the Brooklyn Law Review editors for their valuable comments and insight.
1 Global Index of Religion and Atheism, Winn-Gallup International (July 25, 2012)
available at http://redcresearch.ie/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/RED-C-press-releaseReligion-and-Atheism-25-7-12.pdf. Notable exceptions included Italy (73%) and Poland (81%).
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., DENIS LACORNE, RELIGION IN AMERICA: A POLITICAL HISTORY
(Columbia Univ. Press, 2011) (surveying various theories of American religiosity).
4 Global Index of Religion and Atheism, supra note 1.
5 See, e.g., T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicite: A Comparison of
the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419 (2004); Ahmet T. Kuru & Alfred
Stepan, Laïcité as an “Ideal Type” and a Continuum Comparing Turkey, France, and
Senegal, in DEMOCRACY, ISLAM, AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY (Ahmet T. Kuru & Alfred
Stepan, eds. 2012).
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constitutional tradition has embraced institutional religion, and
has endeavored to protect the church and religious prerogatives
from the potentially tyrannical reach of civil government.6
I open this discussion of religion and the Restatements
with these somewhat generalized cultural observations because
it is important to keep this uniquely American brand of
religious liberty—what Mark DeWolfe Howe has called the
“evangelistic” conception—firmly in mind as we think about
first constitutional principles and the development of the
common law.7 It is very different, in other words, to approach the
relationship between the common law and religion from the
perspective of the secular skeptic than it is to understand the
civil law, generally, as incompetent or inapposite in matters of
faith. The former approach might, for example, tend to
understand doctrinal developments as part of a generalized
effort to exclude religion and religious ideas from judicial
reasoning, while the latter might emphasize the ways that the
common law helps to create legal space for both individual
conscience and church autonomy. Indeed, it is the coexistence
of—and occasionally the tension between—these different
visions that makes the American experience especially complex
and fascinating. And, in practice, both of these theoretical
motivations animate the development of our common law,
sometimes even within the same opinion, and so it may be that
a systematic effort to account for judicial decision-making in
these terms would be both useful and timely.
That, however, is not this article. While I have said it is
important to keep the American evangelistic tradition in mind,
I do not intend here to provide the blueprint for a future
Restatement of Religious Liberty organized around competing
first principles. In truth, as creatures of constitutional law,
religious freedom and disestablishment are probably not the
appropriate focus of the Restatement project. Rather, I hope
here only to identify and clarify those instances when the
existing Restatements already take—or I think should take—
our particular traditions of religious freedom into account: a
map, perhaps, of the places where the common law river
sweeps around the constitutional bedrock of religious liberty.
With this in mind, my approach in this article is threefold. The
first part identifies where religious freedom considerations
6 See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS:
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1967).
7 Id. at 7.
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arise in the existing Restatements. The second draws attention
to potential conflicts within and across the Restatements on
religious freedom issues. The final part offers a few thoughts on
places where the Restatements could, but currently do not,
take religious freedom into detailed account.
I.

RELIGION IN THE EXISTING RESTATEMENTS

Given the importance of religion in American life and
the regular political controversies that arise over questions of
religious freedom, it is perhaps surprising to discover that the
Restatements address the topic relatively infrequently. One likely
explanation for this circumstance is that our particular religious
liberty presents questions of an expressly constitutional
dimension. Thus, to the extent that the relevant principles tend to
develop through something like common law adjudication, that
process occurs largely in the Supreme Court—and decisions
issuing from a single source do not cry out for the kind of detailed
compilation and codification the American Law Institute (ALI)
provides in other contexts. Still, this is not the entire story,
because there are certainly complex, jurisdiction-specific
interactions between constitutional jurisprudence and traditional
areas of private law,8 and in these fields some organizing
guidance is certainly welcome. It is thus hardly a surprise that it
is at some of these intersections that religion makes its limited
appearances in the current Restatements. Although there is
enough extant discussion of religion to allow for an exhaustive
accounting, I will instead attempt to make some rough
generalizations about the common approaches the Restatements
take to religious freedom in a variety of contexts.
At present, the Restatements generally approach issues
of religious freedom in one of two ways, which may roughly
correspond with the twin constitutional guarantees of free
exercise and disestablishment. First, in keeping with the free
exercise clause, there are provisions that approach religious
liberty as a matter of fundamental right, either “natural” or
“constitutional” in nature. Second, the enigmatic promise of the
establishment clause prompted the Restatement Reporters to
express worry in some sections and commentary about the

8 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (employment
discrimination); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (property); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425
(7th Cir. 1994) (tort); In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208 (Colo. 2006) (family law).
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various entanglements that may ensnare those courts that
attempt to adjudicate religious questions.
A.

Rights

The Restatement of Foreign Relations provides a
paradigmatic example of the “natural” rights approach. Section
701 of the third edition declares that all states are “obligated to
respect the human rights of persons subject to [their]
jurisdiction,” including those recognized by the “general principles
of law common to the major legal systems of the world.”9 In
explaining the section, the Reporters’ Notes expressly refer to
portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including
the recognized rights to “freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion.”10 This effort to embed religious freedom in conceptions of
“natural” or “human” rights is certainly understandable in the
context of international law, where positive enactments are
relatively rare and inconsistently respected. Indeed, the
commentary explicitly attempts to link the concepts of “natural”
and “constitutional” rights: “The international law of human
rights has strong antecedents in natural law, in contemporary
moral values, and in the constitutional law of the states.”11 While
this approach to questions of religious freedom is certainly in line
with the constitutional promise of free exercise, it self-consciously
reaches beyond the constitutional text and doctrine to preexisting
moral and jurisprudential traditions. This may be a unique move
among Restatement provisions, and it certainly reflects some of
the difficulties that constitutional and superconstitutional norms
may present for the Restatement project.
The Restatement of Servitudes illustrates the fundamental
rights approach applied, perhaps more comfortably, in the name
of express constitutional rights. Section 3.1(2) of the third edition
declares invalid any “servitude that unreasonably burdens a
fundamental constitutional right.”12 The Comments identify the
“free exercise of religion” as one of the constitutional rights that is
sometimes claimed against servitudes, but goes on to
acknowledge that “[c]laims that servitudes are unconstitutional
have rarely been successful.”13 This is almost certainly because,
as the Comments explain, the “Constitution does not ordinarily
9
10
11
12
13

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 701(c) (1987).
Id. rep. note 6.
Id. cmt. b.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY – SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000).
Id. cmt. d.
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affect the validity of private contracts or conveyances.”14
Nonetheless, the commentary also points out that the Supreme
Court has recognized two circumstances in which private actions
may be subject to constitutional limitations.15 These are the
“traditional government function” cases derived from Marsh v.
Alabama, and the “state entanglement” cases that flow from
Shelley v. Kraemer.16 The former doctrine applies constitutional
limits to private organizations that exercise authority and
functions similar to the government, while the latter proscribes
private agreements that rely on government enforcement
mechanisms.17 These two exceptions to the Fourteenth
Amendment “state action” doctrine raise at least the theoretical
possibility that a servitude placing restrictions on religious
practice might be found unconstitutional. In practice, however,
such cases are more regularly (and successfully) brought under
the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits religiously discriminatory
servitudes.18 Still, Section 3.1 well illustrates the Restatements’
general approach to religion as a matter of constitutional right:
it is a public policy issue of the highest order, which the private
law should bend to accommodate.19
B.

Entanglements

The second broad category of Restatement provisions
dealing with religion seeks to avoid undue judicial entanglement
in matters of personal or institutional religious autonomy. This
undoubtedly arises out of an establishment clause concern that
the adjudication of religious disputes may work to establish
particular beliefs or institutions to the detriment of all others.20 A
nice example of this approach appears in the Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution, Section 2.12, which declares that courts
fashioning custodial parenting plans should not consider the
“religious practices of a parent or the child, except to prevent
Id.
Id.
16 Id. (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948). In truth, the Court has been understandably reluctant to extend the
Shelley rationale. But see, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (finding no cause of
action against seller who violated racially restrictive covenant).
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY – SERVITUDES § 3.1.
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (1988).
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY – SERVITUDES § 3.1, cmt. d.
20 This
approach is, of course, consistent with the Court’s larger
establishment clause jurisprudence. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 603 (1971)
(holding that the establishment clause forbids “excessive entanglement[s]” between
church and state institutions).
14
15
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the child from severe and almost certain harm.”21 The
Comments explain that:
The issue of harm can arise when each parent wishes to expose the
child to a different, conflicting religion. One parent may wish to limit
the religious practices of the other parent when that parent is with
the child, out of concern that those practices are distressing to the
child, perhaps even inhibiting the child’s ability to develop a coherent
religious perspective. . . . The confusion that exposure to different, even
conflicting, religions can be expected to cause in some children is a
harm, like many others (including any harm to children when married
parents attempt to raise their children in two different religions), as to
which the law is ill-equipped to save children. Taking this confusion into
account would require courts to make comparative judgments between
religions, which the U.S. Constitution prohibits. . . . The approach taken
[here] reflects a realism about what courts can be expected to
accomplish with respect to the spiritual health of children when the
parents disagree about a child’s religious upbringing.22

This comment captures two of the fundamental issues that
complicate the relationship between courts and religious practice
in a disestablished polity. First, we are concerned about the
competence of law—and courts, particularly—to solve particular
kinds of problems, and, second, we recognize that these same
concerns, among others, undergird the constitutional separation
of church from state. Indeed, a different illustration makes these
kinds of entanglement concerns even clearer: in a situation where
parents’ differing religious views might affect child health care
decisions, the court should not adjudicate individual disputes,
but rather should award sole health discretion to one parent or
another—basically punt—to avoid intractable future conflicts.23
In truth, of course, not every treatment of religion and
religious freedom that appears in the existing Restatements
fits neatly within the two approaches I have described. The
Restatement of Unfair Competition, for example, reveals that
some courts have contemplated whether the Church of
Scientology can claim parts of its doctrine as a trade secret.24 But
this odd intersection of intellectual property and religious
freedom is undoubtedly the exception and not the rule.
Generally, the Restatements have attempted to flesh out the
21 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.12(1)(c) (2000). While
not technically titled a “Restatement,” the ALI publishes PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION for the same purposes it does the Restatements.
22 Id. cmt. d.
23 Id. § 2.09 cmt. b, ill. 1.
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39 (1993) (citing
Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Lone Com., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1234, 1235,
1250-53 (N.D. Cal., 1995)).
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constitutional protection of free exercise and disestablishment
by treating religion either as a matter of fundamental right, or
as presenting questions of dubious civil competence with which
courts should avoid unnecessary entanglement. It is in organizing
and codifying the applications of these principles in varied
contexts that the ALI has made a valuable contribution to the
law, and, one hopes, where its continued diligence will help
guide us through future controversies.
II.

POTENTIAL CONFLICT ACROSS THE RESTATEMENTS

Issues of religion and religious liberty make their most
frequent appearances in the Restatement of Donative Transfers
and its cousin the Restatement of Trusts. The principal reason
for this seems to be that Americans are wont to condition trusts
and gifts on their beneficiaries’ willingness to adhere to, or
abstain from, certain religious principles or practices. What this
says about the particular character of our national religiosity and
faith is an interesting question in its own right, but one that is
certainly beyond this article’s scope. What matters here is that
the enforceability of such terms and conditions is a matter of some
delicacy and increasing controversy as the Restatements (and the
society they reflect) continue to evolve and become more diverse.
In keeping with the fundamental rights approach
discussed above, both the Restatement of Donative Transfers
and Restatement of Trusts include provisions that place public
policy limits on the kinds of restraints that donors may impose
on beneficiaries.25 Recall that this resort to public policy concerns
is the ALI’s sensible compromise on matters affecting the free
exercise of religion, a settlement that acknowledges the central
place of religious freedom in our national ethos, but concedes that
constitutional rights do not (quite) constrain private conveyances
and contracts.26 As with virtually all questions of public policy,
however, the degree to which the state should act to enforce
private religious conditions and restraints is open to reasonable
disagreement. Indeed, the resolution of this particular question is
a sort of zero-sum game—increased enforcement of a donor’s right
to impose religious conditions often causes a corresponding
decrease in the donee’s rights of free exercise. It is perhaps not

25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 29 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 5.1 (1983).
26 See supra, note 16 and accompanying text.
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surprising, then, that the ALI has struggled to identify a
consistent common law principle governing such situations.
The Restatement of Donative Transfers addresses religious
restraints specifically. Section 8.1 states: “An otherwise effective
provision . . . which is designed to prevent the acquisition . . . of
property on account of adherence to . . . certain religious beliefs or
practices on the part of the transferee is valid.”27 Thus, in the
context of donations or gifts, religious restraints are acceptable as
a matter of public policy. The rationale offered in the Comment
reveals the particular policy choices made, and demonstrates a
decided preference for the religious freedom of the donor and a
general disregard for the rights of the donee:
Generally, society is not concerned with either the particular religious
creed of the individual or the sincerity of his beliefs. The individual is
normally free, not only to believe as he chooses, but to promote his
theological views among others. The rule stated in this section validates
such an attempted promotion of religious views where that promotion
takes the form of a religious restraint annexed to a gift of property.28

The Comment goes on to specify four particular examples
of restraints that are generally valid:
First, the testator may seek to enjoin his devisee from joining a
particular order, or from entering into the ministry of a certain faith,
without any desire to alter the adherence of that devisee to the faith
itself. Second, and for various reasons, he may proscribe marriage
outside the faith of the devisee. Third, the testator, having strong views
about a particular religion, may endeavor to influence his devisee either
to adopt or abandon that faith entirely. Fourth, the testator, opposed to
all deistic religion, may seek to convert the devisee to atheism.29

These examples make it clear that the law of donative
transfers is not overly concerned with the religious freedom of
donees. Indeed, we might think that the kind of restraints
contemplated here would run afoul of the fundamental rights
and public policy concerns expressed in several other fields that
the Restatements cover, including private servitudes.
Changes seem to be afoot, however. The more recent
Restatement of Trusts reflects, perhaps, an evolving
understanding of the potential harms the traditional approach
may visit upon beneficiaries’ rights.30 As with Donative Transfers,
Section 29 of Trusts declares invalid any provision that “is
27
28
29
30

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 8.1 (emphasis added).
Id. cmt. a.
Id. cmt. c.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 29 (2003).
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contrary to public policy.”31 The explanatory comments go on to
single out religious restraints as exactly this sort of invalid
provision. Comment K thus provides:
Individuals are normally free during life to promote their theological
views among others, and to create charitable trusts during life or at
death to support or advance a chosen religion. But the use of private
trusts that create financial pressure regarding the future religious
choices of beneficiaries is a different matter. A trust provision is
ordinarily invalid if its enforcement would tend to restrain the religious
freedom of the beneficiary by offering a financial inducement to embrace
or reject a particular faith or set of beliefs concerning religion.32

This approach, of course, runs counter to the earlier Section
8.1 of Donative Transfers—and probably to many of the public
policy explanations expressed in other Restatements—and thus
represents, an emerging conflict across the Restatement project.
It may be that this conflict reflects a desire to move
beyond the traditionally separate categories of free exercise and
disestablishment, with the older fundamental rights and
entanglement approaches giving way to a newer distinction
between generic and particularized conceptions of religion. Thus,
a Reporter’s Note in the Restatement of Trusts acknowledges that
its approach conflicts squarely with both an earlier Donative
Transfers provision and “[m]ost of the modest number of
American decision[s]” on point,33 but justifies this change as
“reflect[ing] in a general way” both free exercise and
disestablishment principles.34 In other words, the new approach
works to protect beneficiaries’ free exercise rights, and also allays
concerns that state enforcement of a settlor’s particular religious
desires might violate the establishment clause. Indeed, read in a
slightly broader context—within which Trusts disfavors
particularized religious restraints on marriage,35 but would
enforce charitable trusts designed to “advance religion
generally”36—the newer approach may align with so-called
“noncoercion” theories of disestablishment, some of which seem
to view the establishment clause as merely proscribing a
particularly problematic species of free exercise violation.37 That
is to say, the newer approach attempts to protect the free
Id.
Id. cmt. k (citations omitted).
33 See id.
34 Id.
35 Id. cmt. j, Ill. 3.
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28(c) (2003).
37 Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State,
104 NW. U. L. REV. 1653, 1657 (2010).
31
32
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exercise interests of both settlor and beneficiary by enforcing
only those trust conditions that do not coerce an individual
beneficiary into any particularized religious belief or practice.
These last observations are just speculative, of course,
but the underlying conflict in the ALI’s positions on donative
transfers and trusts is quite real. This divergence is all the more
interesting because it does not seem to be motivated by a split in
the existing case law. Rather, the most recent edition of the
Restatement of Trusts has taken it upon itself to revisit the
traditional approach to trust and gift conditions, and this may
mark the start of a larger change in philosophy about the
principles governing a number of other areas of private law. If so,
the shift probably embodies a more sophisticated and more
comprehensive approach to protecting religious liberty in the
context of private agreements, and we should welcome the
ALI’s thoughtful efforts.
III.

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

This final part suggests a few places where the ALI might
consider adding to its discussion of religion or religious liberty in
future editions. In general, I do not mean to argue on behalf of a
particular doctrinal stance or theory of church-state relations, but
only to indicate some areas where the practice might benefit from
some well-reasoned organization and guidance. I am agnostic, in
other words, on the normative substance of the ALI’s position on
various legal controversies, but would welcome more thorough
and thoughtful descriptive efforts to guide practitioners in
certain evolving or nuanced areas. I am aware, of course, that
such descriptive efforts usually require substantive kinds of
choices, and that, once published, the Restatements exert a
significant normative force of their own. I will leave those choices
to the ALI and its future Reporters, however, and simply point
out a few areas that might deserve some attention.
The first such area includes various issues perhaps best
understood through the lens of the so-called “ministerial
exception,” which has been in the news over the last two years.38
The exception, which some Circuit Courts have recognized for
nearly 40 years,39 shields religious organizations from employment
discrimination laws in the context of “ministerial” hiring
38 E.g., Adam Liptak, Religious Groups Given Exception to Work Bias Law,
N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (Jan. 12, 2012).
39 The seminal case is McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
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decisions.40 Thus, such organizations are free to discriminate
against ministerial employees not only on the basis of religion—
which various statutory exemptions already permit41—but also on
the basis of race, gender, and disability.42 In January 2012, the
Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the exception in a suit
brought by a Lutheran schoolteacher under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.43 That case has provoked intense scholarly
debate—some commentators suggest that it places religious groups
“above the law,”44 while others claim it is a necessary safeguard for
“church autonomy”45—in part because it pits fundamental
conceptions of equal protection and religious liberty against one
another.46 As such, the ministerial exception per se is now largely a
creature of constitutional law—again, probably not apt subject
matter for the Restatements—but the underlying concerns
resonate in a number of other private tort contexts.
Some examples we might consider are the problems that
can arise out of tortious conduct on the part of church
leadership or clergy members. On the one hand, principles of
“ecclesiastical” or “charitable” immunity generally no longer
shield church leadership or hierarchy from liability for the
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of malfeasant clergy.47
On the other hand, there is some ambiguity when it comes to
“clergy malpractice”—essentially negligent counseling—a claim
that first appeared in California in the late 1980s.48 Citing First
Amendment concerns, courts have traditionally refused to
impose liability under this theory, inasmuch as the underlying
question is the substantive propriety of clerical counseling or
guidance.49 When the alleged harm is not the substance or content
of the advice given, however, but rather some nonreligious
Id. at 560-61.
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2011).
42 See Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699-701 (2012).
43 Id. at 706.
44 See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the
Ministerial Exception from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1968 (2007);
Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L. J. 981, 1016 (2013).
45 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation,
and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175 (2011); Christopher C.
Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV 1, 46-48 (2011).
46 See
Ian Bartrum, Religion and Race: The Ministerial Exception
Reexamined, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 191 (2011).
47 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical
Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1798-99 (2004) (compiling cases).
48 Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 949-64 (Cal. 1988)
(finding no liability in pastor’s failure to advise parents of child’s suicidal intentions).
49 John F. Wagner Jr., Cause of Action for Clergy Malpractice, 75 A.L.R. 4th
750 §§ 2, 3, 4 (1990) (compiling cases).
40
41
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conduct undertaken in the context of the counseling
relationship—most typically some kind of sexual abuse or
misconduct—courts have been increasingly willing to entertain
tort suits,50 and several states have created statutory causes of
action.51 This distinction has emerged at least in part from
popular pressures following the scandals in the Roman Catholic
Church and from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Employment
Division v. Smith and Jones v. Wolf, which have created the
doctrinal space for courts to adjudicate neutral legal principle—
while still abstaining from disputes over the content of religious
doctrine.52 Despite these emerging complexities, the Restatement
of Torts gives almost no attention to “clergy malpractice”—it
appears only in a few case notes as a non-actionable sort of
claim.53 Some attention to the more recent distinctions and
nuance would be welcome in future editions.
A second area that might benefit from more discussion
of religion and religious freedom is the emerging institution of
same-sex marriage, which may cut across several Restatement
contexts.54 For example, formal state recognition of same-sex
marriage has given rise to a number of questions surrounding
religious exemptions to state anti-discrimination laws.55 In
contemplating these issues several years ago, I wrongly
predicted that we would see very few suits against private
50 See id. § 4; accord Scott C. Idelman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and
the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L. J. 219, 240, 261-62 (2000) (offering
theoretical and institutional reasons for declining recognition of clergy immunity).
51 Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual
Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1996).
52 See Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(finding that the free exercise clause does not shield religious actors from neutral,
generally applicable laws); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-3, 608 (1979) (holding
courts may apply neutral principles of law to resolve disputes within or between
churches, so long as they do not adjudicate matters of religious doctrine). On the
Roman Catholic Church scandal, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 47, at 1818.
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 16, 299A (1965); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).
54 See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds.,
2008). An area I do not discuss that certainly merits attention is the context of family
dissolution, in which, as seen above, religious conflicts may present real problems.
55 See
Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption From
Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who
Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173,
173 (2012). Most states that recognize same-sex marriage provide statutory exemptions to
anti-discrimination law for religious organizations (religious schools, for example, that do
not want to provide married housing to same-sex couples). Most states, however, do not
exempt private service providers. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(l) (2009)
(exempting religious organizations, but not others, from nondiscrimination law
governing public accommodations).
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business owners that refused to provide services to gay couples
on religious grounds, but rightly (I hope) suggested that the
common law could competently address such conflicts if they do
arise.56 Since that time such lawsuits have been filed in several
states, with perhaps the most notable case arising out of a New
Mexico photographer’s refusal to document a same-sex
ceremony.57 Both the trial and appeals courts rejected the
photographer’s claims of First Amendment immunity, but a final
resolution awaits in the state Supreme Court.58 Other notable
cases have arisen in New Jersey, where a church lost its taxexempt status for refusing to allow same-sex weddings on a
boardwalk open to heterosexual couples,59 and in Vermont,
where a same-sex couple filed suit against an inn that refused to
host their wedding.60 There is a potentially important
distinction, however, between the New Mexico case and the
others, in that the photographer has claimed not only a religious
exemption to anti-discrimination law, but has also invoked free
expression protection for the “artistic skills and creative
processes” involved in creating wedding photographs.61 Such an
expressive defense might also be available to florists, caterers,
and other creative service providers, but would not seem open to
businesses and organizations that simply provide the space or
accommodations for couples. In any case, because I continue to
believe that the common law is capable of handling such nuances,
I think some effort to organize and codify the relevant principles
would be a welcome addition to the Restatement project.
There are, of course, several other areas that might
deserve the ALI’s attention regarding issues of religious liberty.
Some that have been brought to my attention include questions
about the enforceability of arbitration decisions in religious
conflicts,62 the application of unconscionability doctrine to

56 Ian C. Bartrum, Same-Sex Marriage in the Heartland: The Case for
Legislative Minimalism in Crafting Religious Exemptions, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 8 (2009).
57 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
58 Id. at 433, 445; Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 296 P.3d 491 (N.M.
2012) (granting certiorari).
59 Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United Methodist Church v. VespaPapaleo, 339 F. App’x. 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2009).
60 Kate Zezima, Couple Sues Vermont Inn for Rejecting Gay Wedding, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/us/
20vermont.html?_r=1&.
61 Willock, 284 P.3d at 438, 440.
62 On this topic, I particularly recommend, Michael A. Helfand, Religious
Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1241-42 (2011).
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contracts signed under religious duress,63 the interpretation of
binding religious documents (perhaps as contracts), and some
explication or codification of the kinds of “religious harms” that
might count as damages in a variety of common law contexts. I
will leave those discussions for other, more able, commentators,
however, and would note only that each of these areas shares in
at least some of the same fundamental conflicts between free
exercise and disestablishment principles, and between communal
and individual religious liberty. Again, this is hardly a surprise as
these enduring contests lie at the very heart of what Marc
DeGirolami has aptly called the “tragedy” of religious freedom.64
CONCLUSION
American religious liberty—with its twin promises of free
exercise and disestablishment—is perhaps a more complex
creature in both theory and practice than that recognized in any
other nation. We have instituted formal legal mechanisms aimed
at protecting both individual and group religious practice against
state interference, and have sought also to protect the state itself
against incursions by those groups or individuals who would bend
its coercive power to their religious ends. These first principles
are sometimes in tension, and there are certainly circumstances
when judicial efforts to further one goal can actually undercut
the other. It is precisely in these circumstances that the
common law surrounding religious freedom becomes most
complex and controverted, and it is thus in these areas that
guidance from the Restatements is most welcome.
I have attempted here to identify the current Restatements’
basic approaches to questions of religious freedom, and have
suggested that—not surprisingly—those approaches seem to reflect
our underlying first principles. The Restatements generally treat
religion either as a matter of fundamental right, or as a subject
matter from which courts should seek to disentangle themselves. I
have also identified one place—the treatment of religious
conditions in trusts as opposed to donative transfers—where the
tension between these principles and approaches has manifested
itself in expressly conflicting provisions. Here it seems that the
more recent approach attempts to reconcile the religious rights of
both parties to such transactions. Finally, I have made a few
63 Religious duress might occur when a religious organization pressures an
individual to enter into an agreement based on the fear of God, damnation,
excommunication, or some other form or religious consequence or punishment.
64 MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 55 (2013).
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suggestions for places that future Restatements might consider
adding some discussion of religious liberty. In particular, the
common law surrounding clergy liability and same-sex marriage
seems in need of clarification.
Finally, I want to make it clear that my comments and
suggested additions to the Restatement are in no way meant as a
criticism of the ALI’s efforts to date. Indeed, it is the very insight
and clarity that the Restatements have brought to so many topics
within the common law that makes the idea of future efforts in
these areas so appealing. Thus, in the end these suggestions might
be just one more of those burdens that are so often thrust upon
those who do their jobs just a little too well.

